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ABSTRACT
This project is an analysis of two cyber-attack analysis frameworks and
how they may relate to a small business environment. Small businesses suffer
significantly from malware attacks like ransomware. This analysis looks at the
Cyber Kill Chain framework and the MITRE ATT&CK framework by looking at
how each compare when applied to a simple small network and a malware
attack. Each framework broke down the cyber-attack differently and by looking at
how the frameworks performed within the simplified network provided insights to
when small businesses should focus on malware risk reduction. Each framework,
despite having different methods of analysis, arrived at similar conclusions about
the environment. The role that users play in the environment when it comes to
malware prevention becomes evident. The frameworks show the importance of
proper user training in malware prevention. In small businesses and other
organizations with small budgets investing in user malware awareness may
prove a better investment than complicated expensive to buy and expensive to
maintain solutions.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

Project Motivation
Ransomware and Malware have continued to evolve since first appearing
on computer systems. Today the headlines are regularly broadcasting the odd
names of the latest ransomware attack. On May 7, 2021, the Darkside
ransomware hit Colonial Pipeline, effectively shutting down the largest pipeline of
refined oil products in the US (Neuman, 2021). Colonial Pipeline’s data that
Darkside had encrypted was held to a 75-bitcoin ransom, at the time valued at 5
million U.S. dollars. Ransomware attacks have become more prevalent and more
sophisticated over time. The reason for this is because ransomware has become
a very profitable industry for those who design malware/ransomware and for
those who use it to extort money from victims.
The news media regularly posts about the latest data breaches and
attacks on large enterprises and the government. The items that are not
newsworthy are the effects of cyber-attacks, like ransomware, on small
businesses. Small businesses bear a large part of the burden of a cyber-attack.
The impact of an attack on a small business can be significant, potentially
resulting in the business shutting down (Johnson, 2019). The US government is
aware of this fact. During committee hearings for the American Cybersecurity
Literacy Act, Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) said “Ransomware attacks are on
the rise, putting Americans’ data and privacy at risk. Too often people do not
1

know about steps they can take to protect themselves online” (Klobuchar, 2021).
The US government recognizes that there is a threat to small businesses and
has passed legislation like Senate Bill S.2483 Improving Cybersecurity of Small
Organizations Act of 2021.
The problem of numerous cyber-attacks has led to the creation of various
framework designs to assist in the analysis and defense of attacks (Orchilles,
2022). Frameworks are created as a foundational structure on which to build on
top for analysis and defense. The government response to this threat has been a
series of documents and sites to assist individuals, groups, enterprises, and
government entities. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
produced the Risk Manage Framework (RMF) SP 800-37 (NIST.Gov., 2018,).
This framework is based on risk and designed to assist in selecting and
implementing risk mitigating controls (Dempsey, 2014). The RMF from NIST is
made up of seven steps. The steps are Prepare, Categorize, Select, Implement,
Asses, Authorize and Monitor (NIST.GOV, 2018). Each step is designed to assist
an organization with managing its cyber security risk management program.
Along with the Risk Management Framework from NIST, many others
have been created. The Cyber Kill Chain is the most widely known, developed by
defense contractor Lockheed Martin in 2011. The Cyber Kill Chain framework is
also made up of seven steps. Unlike those from NIST, these steps are not riskbased but instead based on the components of a cyber-attack. A methodology
based on the attack creates a framework that looks at both at offense and
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defense. The premise is that understanding every move of the adversary will
allow the defense the opportunity to stop the attack at one of the seven steps.
Another framework that has been developed, that is also based on the
actions of the adversary is the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and
Common Knowledge (ATT&CK) framework. The MITRE ATT&CK framework,
unlike the others is made up of 14 tactics instead of seven and are used to create
matrixes that assist in analysis. The tactics used by the ATT&CK framework are
Resource Development, Initial Access, Execution, persistence, privilege
escalation, defense evasion, Credential access, discovery, Lateral Movement,
Collection, command and control (C2), exfiltration, and impact. With this many
tactics, the matrices can be large and incredibly detailed (MITRE ATT&CK,
2021).
All the frameworks are designed to assist in the creation of a defense
posture and when the defense fails. They assist in analyzing what went wrong
and help to fill the gap that was exploited. Many private companies use one of
these or a combination of frameworks for assistance in data defense.

Problem Statement
The US government has identified the threat of cyberattacks such as
ransomware on small businesses (S.2483 - 117th Congress, 2022). Many of the
small businesses defined by the U.S. Small business administration (SBA), small
business size standards also have the budgets to have a framework to their
3

business. Within the SBA standards is the category of Microbusinesses.
Microbusinesses are those employers with 1-9 employees, and in 2016 made up
74.8 percent of all private-sector employers (Headd, 2019). Many of the
businesses this size are called Small Office, Home Office (SOHO) businesses.
These microbusinesses have neither the budget nor expertise to apply one of
these frameworks.
This project will answer the following questions:
•

Which components of the Cyber Kill Chain and the ATT&CK
frameworks are most relevant to the small office network?

•

How can these components be implemented to small office
(Microbusiness) networks?

This culminative experience project is organized as follows: chapter 2 will
provide a review of the literature, chapter 3 will describe the methods used to
answer the project questions, and chapter 4 will analyze the steps of the
frameworks and determine the components that are most relevant to
Microbusiness networks. Chapter 5 will provide the discussion, conclusions, and
areas for further research.
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CHAPTER TWO:
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Cyber Kill Chains, What are They?
The kill chain was originally a military concept that was used to define the
structure of an attack. The idea was that for an adversary to complete their main
objective, they would have to complete a series of intermediary goals (Greenert
& Welsh, 2013). It is the sum of these goals that creates the “kill chain” and each
step links to the next step. To stop the adversary at any one of the steps breaks
the chain. To break the chain the defenders must have a defense in place that
mitigates a step in the kill chain. The steps to mount a defense are the inverse to
steps for the kill chain to succeed.
The Cyber Kill Chain concept is essentially the same as the military
version. You have an adversary with a goal which must be stop at one of the
steps to prevent the adversary from reaching their goal. In 2011, military
contractor Lockheed Martin developed their Cyber Kill Chain from a threat model
they identified. Lockheed Martin identified a threat model from which it developed
the Cyber Kill Chain. Lockheed Martin identified a threat model from which it
developed the Cyber Kill Chain (Hutchins E, et al., 2010).
There was a new threat landscape evolving and Lockheed Martin
developed the model to address this new threat of the Advanced Persistent
Threat (APT). The APT is an adversary with a high level of expertise and
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substantial resources at their disposal. The APT can reach the objectives through
many attack vectors and is not limited to a single methodology. The APT looks to
establish footholds to exfiltrate information on a continuous basis (Hutchins et al.,
2010). The cyber frameworks were created to mitigate the failures of previous
conventional incidence response methods that were ill prepared to address the
problem the APT posed. Conventional incidence response before the creation of
frameworks had two flawed premises, item 1: response should happen after the
point of compromise and item 2: the compromise was from a fixable flaw
(Hutchins et al., 2010). The goal of the APT is to remain undetected for as long
as possible, so in the case of item 1 responding after the compromise is a
problem as the APT is completing their mission until discovered.
On December 20, 2020, the company FireEye announced that they had
discovered an intrusion that used the popular commercial software Orion created
by the company SolarWinds. FireEye named this backdoor malware
“SUNBURST.” It was sophisticated software and a perfect example of an APT
deployment. The threat actors designed their mission around SUNBURST
knowing that it would not appear as an indicator of compromise (IOC) to
traditional identification systems. This made scanners and other platforms that
would normally look for IOC activity ineffective. FireEye announced their findings
in December 2020 and the first evidence of confirmed sunburst activity occurred
in March of 2020. The attackers that had compromised SolarWinds released their
malicious code int the ORION software platform in February 2020. Once on the
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system SUNBURST went to work unnoticed and undetected for 6 months by
many if not most organizations until the FireEye announcement in December.
This headline-making APT is an example of the real threat that ATPs’ can have
on an organization. According to the SEC filing from SolarWinds, 18,000 of its
300,000 customers had an installation of the products containing the
SUNBURST vulnerability (cisecurity.org, 2021).

Multi-Layer Approach
The sophistication of the modern adversary has meant that defense must
take on a multi-layer approach. The high-level view of architecture is not
sufficient to identify, categorize, document, and mitigate gaps in architecture.
NIST 800-53 under Systems and Services acquisition family (SA) is section SA8. Section SA-8 Security and Privacy Engineering principles cover the principle of
defense-in-depth (NIST, 2020). Defense-in-depth is not a one-to-one solution, it
is instead a comprehensive methodology for protecting every identified asset.
Infrastructures are made up of various layers. The layered approaches of NIST
are risked based designs that look at the risk to an asset to determine how to
apply a defensive control. The steps and flow of the risk management framework
from NIST SP 800-37, Figure 1, are a complementary and iterative cycle allowing
items to be revisited in any order.
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Figure 1. Risk Management Framework (Csrc.nist.org, sp. 800-37)

Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) Review
The Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) was developed by defense contractor
Lockheed Martin in 2011. An intrusion-based model in which the adversary must
breach the environment’s perimeter, establish a foothold inside the environment,
and move towards exploiting the “confidentiality, integrity and availability” (CIA) of
the environment. From analysis of intrusions is how the CKC intrusion model was
defined (Hutchins et al., 2010). As previously noted, the CKC is a seven-step
process based on the intrusive actions of the adversary. The ideal scenario is to
stop the adversary at one of the steps prior to the seventh. The adversary must
move through each of the steps to accomplish their objective. This is key in
deconstructing an attack when the attacker is successful. Being able to reverse
engineer an attack after a breach creates a lesson learned opportunity for the
8

organization involved to resolve a vulnerability after being exploited. More
importantly, the ability to reverse engineer an attack allows researchers to
discover and analyze any new evolving techniques of the adversary. This is how
IOCs are discovered and put into practice. By understanding the seven steps and
how they flow together better defense practices can be created. Steps of the
Cyber Kill Chain
The CKC is composed of seven steps to understand an attack and assist
in preparing a defense. The links of the CKC, figure 2, are Reconnaissance,
Weaponization, Delivery, Exploitation, Installation, Command and Control (C2),
and action on Objectives.

Figure 2 Cyber Kill Chain Steps

Step 1: Reconnaissance Here the adversary conducts research to
identify potential targets. Targets are often found through Open-source
intelligence (OSINT). Another method for finding a target is using Botnets to scan
perimeters for vulnerabilities. This is the mission planning phase of the operation.
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Step 2: Weaponization The weaponization phase is where the information
gathered during phase one is used to create a method for delivering the payload.
This could be inserting the payload into a file that can be emailed. Creating
websites that can install malicious code via the browser of file download. The
main goal here is to create malware that takes advantage of an exploit and turns
that into a deliverable payload.
Step 3: Delivery This is the phase that is the official start of the
adversary’s operational contact with the target. It is here that the payload is
launched at the target. This could be a website exploit, a phishing email to a
malicious site, and email with a malicious document, etc. The Lockheed Martin
Incident Response Team (LC-CIRT) found that the three most common vector for
delivery of the payload were email attachments, websites, and USB media
(Hutchins et al., 2010). Understanding the delivery vectors allows an organization
to identify the delivery vectors of the highest risk to the organization. This
knowledge is from understanding the operation of this phase. Knowing and
understanding these vectors gives the defender the first opportunity to mitigate
an attack this step. An example of a mitigation could be scanning emails for
malicious data before they are allowed to enter the user’s mailbox for viewing.
Step 4: Exploitation It is in the exploitation phase that the payload is
delivered within the environment. The malicious payload is now within the
organization. The payload will exploit the target either by taking advantage of a
vulnerability in an application or the operating system. Sometimes, adversaries
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can take advantage of users by exploiting user behavior, such as getting a user
to open an email. This is the phase where the defender gets the second
opportunity to act in defense of the organization. The intruder is now inside the
environment. Here is where defense begins to make a difference. If an email with
a malicious attachment now sits on an internal mail server this could be that any
scanners failed to identify, alert, log, quarantine/sanitize the malicious payload.
An effective tactic at this phase can be as simple as the training of users to be
aware of and be able to identify malicious emails. This type of training can stop
an adversary at this step.
Step 5: Installation In the installation phase the adversary seeks to
establish persistence. The goal of the attack at this stage is to establish itself as
an APT. This is performed through the installation of an application, usually some
type of backdoor that allows access to the system even after the original
exploited vulnerability is resolved. Through this backdoor application, the
adversary can achieve and maintain persistence. This is the third opportunity for
the defender to stop the attack. Having tools in place that can possibly detect,
alert, log or act on anomalous behaviors is a start to stopping the adversary at
this step.
Step 6: Command and Control (C2) This is when the malware or
application establishes communication to outside the organization to the C2
network. Once communication to the C2 network is created, the adversary has
now established a presence within the target environment. The defender must
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now discover the communication to the C2 network by identifying the outbound
communications. Blocking communication to the C2 will break the chain at this
step. This will involve detection of the traffic but often the APT will hide the
communication within common protocols to try and obfuscate detection.
Step 7. Action on objectives. This is the final step. The adversary now has
established access to the environment and can begin moving toward
accomplishing their objective. The objective can be anything from collecting data,
exfiltration, destroying infrastructure from the inside, lateral movement through
the environment, and overwriting or corrupting data. With established
persistence, the APT is free to explore the environment looking for the
adversary’s objective requirements. At this stage, the defender must react as fast
as possible to any signs of intrusion. Time is critical for defenders once the APT
is inside the network and actively working towards completing the objective. The
adversary will continue establishing a greater foothold in the environment until
the defender detects, identifies, and stops the attack.
The CKC has also served as a valuable diagnostic and analysis tool by
dividing the attack into smaller segments that can be looked at individually in
greater detail. When multiple attacks are executed that follow a similar
methodology during the kill chain analysis patterns begin to emerge. Identifying
the patterns allows for a greater understanding of the attack. T These identified
patterns give the defender mitigating controls at the steps where the emergent

12

patterns point to an exploitable weakness or where a control can be used to
break the chain.

MITRE ATT&CK Review
The MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge
(ATT&CK) is a framework designed to around the behavior of the cyber
adversary. Like CKC it has various steps called tactics of the attack lifecycle and
the targeted platform. MITRE ATT&CK evolved out of a MITRE project to
document adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) against
Microsoft Windows systems. Developed in 2013 the first ATT&CK framework
was designed around the Windows enterprise environment. Continued research
by MITRE expanded the framework to 96 techniques within 9 tactics. The project
has continued to evolve and expand. In 2017 MITRE ATT&CK included
Windows, MAC, Linux and Mobile, added Cloud in 2019 and Integrated Control
Systems (ICS) in 2020 (Strom et al., 2018).
ATT&CK has demonstrated that it is applicable in various use cases. Like
the CKC, it can be applied to adversary emulation and defense gap analysis.
One use case is in the development of behavioral analytics. Analytics that look at
behaviors are useful in detection of malicious activities within an environment
without the need of prior knowledge of the exploitation method. As shown in the
CKC model identifying patterns is also a major feature of the ATT&CK model. In
today’s large organization a key operational feature is the Security Operation
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Center (SOC); it is at this centralized location where large enterprises aggregate
all their monitoring and alerting. The ATT&CK framework is useful to the SOC to
measure how effective a SOC is at detecting, analyzing, and reporting malicious
activities
The ATT&CK Matrix
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a matrix made up of tactics known to
be used by adversaries to reach an objective. The list of tactics is equivalent to
the 7 phases of the CKC. The ATT&CK framework has taken the tactics and
associated them into a series of techniques. The matrix is formed when the
tactics are associated with specific techniques. For example, the reconnaissance
tactic contains the active scanning technique. With each tactic there are several
techniques, for example, reconnaissance contains 10 techniques. The adversary
must move through each of the 14 tactics to reach the objective, in the exact
same way that in the CKC the adversary must move through the 7 phases.
MITRE has created matrices for several architectures under three main
categories enterprise, cloud, mobile and ICS.
The Tactics of the ATT&CK Matrix
The ATT&CK matrix for enterprises contains 14 tactics. Within each tactic there
are a series of techniques. Each technique has one or more sub-techniques
defined. The most significant feature of the matrix is that each technique
describes in detail what the adversary is trying to accomplish with that technique.
This is important for conducting an analysis of a successful attack by an
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adversary. The fourteen tactics of the ATT&CK matrix for enterprises are
Reconnaissance, Resource Development, Initial Access, Execution, Persistence,
Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion, Credential Access, Discovery, Lateral
Movement, Collection, Command and Control, Exfiltration, and Impact (see
APPENDIX A).
Tactic 1 Reconnaissance. The adversary gathers information to plan an
operation. This could be done through active scanning, or gathering identity
information like email addresses, credentials, and employee names.
Tactic 2 Resource Development. In this objective the adversary may need
to acquire resources. An example technique inside this object is Acquire
Infrastructure and this contains the sub-technique: domains. The adversary may
acquire domains for phishing email campaigns or C2 network operations.
Tactic 3 Initial Access. The adversary is actively trying to gain access to
the network. A commonly used technique listed in this objective is phishing and
includes three sub-techniques with one being the spear phishing attachment. In
this type of phishing email a malicious attachment is included in the email to
attempt to gain access to the organization’s network. Tactic three, like the third
step in the CKC is the first point where the defender has an opportunity to place
a defensive control to stop the progression of the attack.
Tactic 4 Execution. This objective consists of techniques that will run
adversary-controlled code on the local system when executed. There are twelve
techniques in this tactic, many of which have sub-techniques to further provide
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details as to how this objective may be accomplished. This is another tactic
where the defense can place controls to mitigate exploitation.
Tactic 5 Persistence. At this stage in the ATT&CK matrix the adversary is
inside the environment and needs to establish a persistent foothold. This tactic
has nineteen techniques, many with sub-techniques. The techniques used for
this tactic will maintain the adversary’s access regardless of system interruptions
that would usually cut access.
Tactic 6 Privilege Escalation. The techniques within this tactic are about
the adversary gaining a higher level of privilege so that they can continue moving
forward towards mission completion. This step may involve the adversary going
from standard user permissions to root level or administrator level. These
techniques often overlap with those from the persistence tactic.
Tactic 7 Defense Evasion. In defense evasion the adversary is trying to
actively avoid being detected. This tactic contains techniques and subtechniques that are used to stop security software or use trusted processes to
hide malware applications. Defense evasion has the largest number of
techniques with twenty-nine in total.
Tactic 8 Credential Access. This is one of the most important tactics to the
success of the adversary. Capturing allows the APT to expand its presence by
being able to use valid credentials to access systems. In environments that
impose a single sign-on (SSO) system, one compromised account will give the
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adversary unrestricted access to all the authorized resources of the
compromised account.
Tactic 9 Discovery. This is a crucial part of the attack the adversary is at a
point trying to learn as much as possible about the environment. Stopping the
adversary at this part of the operation will limit how the adversary will act to reach
the next phase and may not be able to continue forward.
Tactic 10 Lateral Movement. Here, the adversary moves throughout the
environment, often using valid credentials to move throughout multiple systems.
Lateral movement can be propagated through tainted share techniques, by
placing malicious software in shared locations where other users can trigger the
software. This places the adversary at the persistence phase of the newly
compromised machine. A mitigation for this would be execution prevention by
blocking the execution of malicious software.
Tactic 11 Collection. The now identified materials of value are collected.
With the data collected the usual next step is to steal the data via the exfiltration.
The APT will often try to maintain access to the compromised system for as long
as possible. This will involve an intermediary step twelve before exfiltration of
data or in conjunction with removing the data.
Tactic 12 Command and Control. This C2 tactic, if successful allows the
adversary to communicate with the system(s) in the environment under the
adversary’s control. To avoid detection, the attacker must hide the
communication channel by appearing normal expected network communication.
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A common mitigation is the use of network intrusion prevention systems that try
to identify the C2 specific traffic.
Tactic 13 Exfiltration. This tactic consists of the adversarial techniques
used to remove the high value target data away from the organization and into
the adversary's possession. That data maybe exfiltrated via the C2 channels or
some other channel. This step is extremely critical for the organization as data is
actively being exfiltrated out of the environment. The amount of data to leak out
of an environment is directly related to the amount of time it takes for the
defender to detect and close this phase of the attack. This tactic is difficult to
mitigate with preventive controls because the communication is based on taking
advantage of already exploited system features. The best option for mitigation
will be the detection of exfiltration techniques, such as the detection of unusual
network traffic.
Tactic 14 Impact. This tactic is the most detrimental to the organization.
The goal of this tactic is to destroy systems and data. The most technique seen
from this tactic is the Data Encrypted for Impact technique. This impact tactic
technique is more commonly known as the ransomware attack.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is designed to be very flexible and
detailed in the way it approaches an intrusion-based attack. The layout of the
matrix creates a flow path as the adversary moves along the objectives executing
Adversarial Tactics and Techniques (ATT); this road map can easily be followed.
Following the attack trail assists in the design and implementation of mitigating
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controls. These trails created from the analysis of multiple organizations hit by a
similar attack have allowed the MITRE ATT&CK framework to create groups of
related intrusion activities. These groupings are the designations for clusters of
similar activities that may also overlap with other groupings. The groups can then
be correlated to actual threat actor groups or communities.
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CHAPTER THREE:
METHODOLOGY

Analysis Process
Kill chain frameworks have proven to be an effective tool for analyzing
cyber-attacks from both offensive and defensive viewpoints. Defense against the
adversary can be a challenge for large companies and possibly harder for small
companies. To the attacker both are important targets. The frameworks have
proven effective for large organizations. The focus of this project is not to
evaluate, claim or determine efficacy. The purpose is to look at the frameworks
from the defensive posture of a small office network environment.
Procedure.
The process for comparing the two frameworks will be done by taking an
adversarial approach at the defender network. By following the adversaries'
attack step-by-step the goal is to associate the steps of the attack with a step in a
framework. The identified steps of the framework will be correlated against points
on a network diagram. If the points on the network can be identified, what are the
recommended mitigating controls from the framework, and is that control in or
available? This will result is data that can be analyzed to compare the
frameworks.
The Frameworks. The two frameworks will be compared separately. The
seven steps of the CKC framework will be applied to the network and aligned to
the adversary’s attack process. Then the 14 steps of the ATT&CK framework will
20

be applied. They will both go up against the same adversary and the same
network.
The Target: Small Business Network. The network is a basic small
business network. This is a low-budget network and is limited in its allocated
resources. Sophisticated mitigating controls are non-existent due to the low
budget requirement of the small business. The network will be defined simply as
desktops running windows 10. In 2020 windows 10 made up 72.2 percent of
windows, including machines, desktop, and laptop (Keizer, 2020). Windows 10
includes the Windows Defender Antivirus, a local software firewall product for
free. In any environment where cost is a factor “free” holds a significant stake
and because Windows Defender is free many competitors offer a free version of
their software. This is updated along with the operating system on “Patch
Tuesday,” Microsoft’s now well-known second Tuesday of every month patch
release cycle. (Security Update Guide FAQs, 2022). Lastly this simple network
will have the internet access firewall that is supplied to anyone who signs up for a
basic internet plan from their local Internet Service Provider (ISP). By default, all
these ISP supplied devices block inbound internet traffic and allow outbound
internet traffic. These devices function like the ones that an ISP would supply to
home users when a person requests internet for their home. This level of
simplicity and lack of sophistication provides the most basic test bed to compare
frameworks.
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The Adversary: Bazar Malware. The adversary will be the Bazar malware
which had two common forms: the BazarLoader malware or BazarCall malware
(Duncan, 2021). This adversary has several features that made it a good
candidate for the project. One feature is that it is a good candidate for spam
email delivery. Investigations showed that several methods were used to email it
out as spam emails. The emails used combined various social engineering
techniques to get the payload on to the system. The first example campaign was
BazarLoader it targeted large enterprises using business-focused emails. The
emails appeared to be invoices or inquiries that contained a malicious
attachment or link to a malicious site. The emails were made to appear personal
to try and get the employee to open the malicious attachment (Brandt, 2021).
Another BAZAR malware campaign was BazarCall. This campaign combined two
social engineering techniques. The first part was a spam email with no personal
information, links, nor attachments; rather the email stated that a free trial
subscription was expiring and about to auto renew for an expensive fee. To stop
the auto-renew from happening the victim is directed to call customer service at
some phone number to cancel the auto-renew. Any person calling the number
would talk to someone who would direct the victim to a very professional looking
website with the unsubscribe details and the unsubscribe button. Clicking the
button delivers the malicious payload infecting the local machine with
BazarLoader (Duncan, 2021).
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Figure 3 BazarCall Chain of Events (Duncan 2021)

The Evaluation Process.
Step 1. Align Framework to Malware. This process involves taking the
Bazar processes and corelate them with the steps of a framework. The Bazar
process contains nine events. The malware processes may fall under a single
framework step, multiple steps, or none of the steps. After the malware and the
framework have been aligned, proceed to the next step.
Step 2. Align Malware to the Network. Involves taking the Bazar malware
processes and corelating it to the target network. The results of this analysis will
be identical for both tests because the network and the malware are not
changing. This step only needs to be performed once for the Bazar malware.
Step 3. Create Final Overlay. This step involves combining the first two
steps into a final diagram that demonstrates how all the pieces interact for the
given framework. This test will be used to look at how well the frameworks mesh
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with a small network. This step should provide enough detail for the data needed
to look at our problem statement.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS

This chapter will follow the process for the analysis procedure. The
process will be applied to each framework. The adversary and the network will
remain constant. The adversary will be the well-known and studied Bazar
malware.

Cyber Kill Chain Analysis
The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) is a seven-step process
based on the intrusive actions of the adversary. The steps of the CKC are
Reconnaissance, Weaponization, Delivery, Exploitation, Installation, Command
and Control (C2), and Action on Objectives.
Step 1. Align to CKC Framework to Malware
The first step of the CKC is reconnaissance and is considered a pre-attack
step. The adversary is not interacting with the target but during this phase is
researching potential targets or developing a strategy to reach out to targets, like
with the use a spam phishing email campaign. Targets rarely detect this phase of
the CKC even if the target is well funded. In the case of small businesses with
small budgets and low technical knowledge they do not usually have the
resources to conduct this phase.
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The weaponization phase is the second stage in the CKC and a pre-attack
phase. This is the step when the Bazar malware is developed. The
weaponization as seen with Bazar is learned after the discovery of Bazar. There
was no evidence of the development life cycle prior to the malware first detection.

Figure 4 CKC With Bazar, Based on Duncan,2021

Step three “Delivery” is the first point of contact between the CKC and
Bazar malware. Delivery contains all actions required to get the weapon onto the
target systems (Hahn et. al., 2015). During the summer of 2021, the samples of
the Bazar there were being spread via three campaigns. All three campaigns
used email in some form to get the attention of the target (Duncan, 2021). In the
two most common campaigns, the adversary would either email the target an
email with a malicious attachment or an email with the contact information for a
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call center. The call center would direct the target to a web site where the target
would download the weaponized spreadsheet document (Duncan, 2021).

Table 1. Two Common Delivery Methods
Option A

Option B

Send email with malicious attachment

Send email with call center request

Attachment is malicious spreadsheet

Call center redirects victims
Victim downloads malicious
spreadsheet

The Exploitation phase is the key phase for how the CKC, Bazar malware,
the adversary and target line up. At this point the payload is on the target system
ready for deployment. The document contains an action or set of actions known
as macros that want to run on the target system. Macros are disabled by default
and the user interaction is required to allow the macros to run. The confidence to
allow the macro to run has been instilled in the target user via social engineering
measures in the delivery phase.
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Figure 5 Screenshot of the Malicious Excel Spreadsheet (duncan,2021)

Phase five the installation of the BazarLoader executable. For this phase
to be completed there are 2 steps that need to be accomplished with the macros
being enabled in the previous phase. The first part is the macro needs to be able
to exit the system. If the macro can exit the network to the adversary’s remote
systems, then it retrieves the BazarLoader executable and installs it on the local
system. The level of control that the adversary can exert over the system is
based on the level of exploitation the attack was able to perform. This step is
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where the adversary establishes persistence by modifying the system to maintain
remote access to the system.
Phase six of the CKC framework is when command and control (C2) is
established. The adversary can now remotely access the system through the C2
channel. This two-way communication channel lets the adversary manipulate the
target system. With remote access established, the adversary can move to the
next step.
The last phase in the CKC is the action on objectives. The adversary can
now proceed to completing their mission objectives. This can be collecting data,
exfiltration of data, and further reconnaissance of the target environment looking
for ways to expand the scope of the mission. The defender must detect this
phase and stop the adversary as soon as possible because the adversary is now
actively acting within the environment.
Step 2. Align Malware to Target
The Bazar malware primary focus is to exploit the user to get the
malicious software on the target system. Once the malware is on the target
system it proceeds to exposit the local host to gain access to the rest of the
network. As a result, the adversary remains a persistent threat until it is
discovered and cleansed from the system.
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Figure 6 Bazar Within the Network

Step 3. Combine Cyber Kill Chain with Bazar Within the Target Network
In combining the CKC and the Bazar malware with the network the goal is
to look for patterns. First there is no need to add steps one and two from the
CKC as they are pre-attack steps and not with the scope of the network’s
capability. This determination was made because many small businesses lack
the resources to investigate steps one and two from the CKC. This overlay seen
in figure 7 shows an emerging pattern. The benefit of frameworks like the CKC is
in the assistance with finding patterns that may help with defense in a cyberattack.
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Figure 7 CKC With Bazar in Network

The ATT&CK Framework Analysis
The MITRE ATT&CK Framework is a series of tactics and techniques.
There are 14 tactics in the enterprise matrix. The fourteen are Reconnaissance,
Resource Development, Initial Access, Execution, Persistence, Privilege
Escalation, Defense Evasion, Credential Access, Discovery, Lateral Movement,
Collection, Command and Control, Exfiltration, and Impact. The ATT&CK matrix
has more items than the CKC framework. The ATT&CK framework will be more
detailed in how it breaks the adversary's steps. There is a need for shorthand to
denote techniques with sub-techniques with the added detail. When a subtechnique is used the main technique will first define it with the sub-technique as
follows [technique: sub-technique] (MITRE ATT&CK 2021). after being defined
will be referred by the sub-technique.
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Step 1. Align to ATT&CK Framework to Malware
In the ATT&CK framework the first two steps are not in scope. Just like in
the CKC, the pre-attack parts of the framework cannot be measured when
correlating the malware process to the framework. The Initial access tactic is the
first point of contact. There is one technique with one sub-technique in the initial
access tactic, [Phishing: Spear phishing Link]. The primary technique is Phishing.
This identifies the email sent to the user to start the process. The one subtechnique is spear phishing since the email was designed to convince the target
to not ignore the email and follow any required process defined in the email.
This tactic has 12 techniques and Bazar uses five of the twelve. Two main
techniques are 1) Native API and 2) Windows management instrumentation.
There are four sub-techniques, Native API is the technique that involves the
Bazar malware using a windows native application programming interface (API)
as part of its processes. The second listed main technique is Windows
management instrumentation Bazar uses this call to query the OS about the
installed antivirus engine. The sub-techniques are [Command and Scripting
Interpreter: PowerShell], [Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows
Command Shell], [Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task], and [User Execution:
Malicious Link]. The adversary uses Windows Command Shell to execute
cmd.exe to perform reconnaissance (MITRE ATT&CK 2021). The Malicious Link
is the key part to compromising the user.
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Persistence is what makes the APT extremely harmful to the organization.
In this tactic the adversary deploys one primary technique and four subtechniques. The techniques used are BITS jobs, [Boot or Login AutoStart
Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder], [Boot or Login AutoStart
Execution: Shortcut Modification], and [Boot or Login AutoStart Execution:
Winlogon Helper DLL].
Privilege escalation is one of the most important components of the
adversary’s plan of attack. There are six sub-techniques used to complete this
goal there are [Boot or Logon AutoStart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup
Folder], [ Boot or Logon AutoStart Execution: Shortcut Modification], [ Boot or
Logon AutoStart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL], [ Process Injection: Process
Doppel ganging], [ Process Injection: Process Hollowing], and [Scheduled
Task/Job: Scheduled Task].
The next tactic is defense evasion, and it is here that we encounter the
first repeat technique, BITS jobs. The other main techniques are Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information and Process Injection. The subtechniques are [Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools], [ Indicator Removal
on Host: File Deletion], [ Masquerading: Double File Extension], [ Masquerading:
Masquerade Task or Service], [ Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or
Location], [ Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing], and [Virtualization/Sandbox
Evasion: Time Based Evasion].
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The most dangerous part to the environment is credential access. Access
to credentials gives the adversary a lot of power over the system allowing the
adversary to gain access across the environment with the user’s credentials.
Now in the credential access tactic the are no techniques executed by the Bazar
malware.
One of the tactics with the greatest number of techniques executed is the
discovery tactic. With ten techniques and five sub-techniques the list is Domain
Trust Discovery, File and Directory Discovery, Network Share Discovery,
Process Discovery, Query Registry, Remote System Discovery, System Network
Configuration Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery, System Information
Discovery, System Time Discovery, [Account Discovery: Local Account],
[Account Discovery: Domain Account], [Software Discovery: Security Software
Discovery], [System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery], and
[Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion].
Often, malware will not contain a tactic and completely bypass a tactic
because a previously exploited step allowed the next step to be skipped. The
tactic lateral movement is completely bypassed because Bazar is primarily a
downloader and backdoor malware.
Bazar now begins to collect data from the system, this step is the
collection tactic, and the executed technique is Data from Local system. Bazar
can search the local file system for data. The problem is that now Bazar is
looking for places to hide files that will be downloaded when C2 is established.
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This next step is the Command and Control (C2) tactic. Four out of the 16
listed by ATT&CK are used and four sub-techniques. The main techniques are
Fallback Channels, Ingress Tool Transfer, Multi-Stage Channels, and Web
Service. The four sub-techniques are [Application Layer Protocol: Web
Protocols], [Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms], [Encrypted
Channel: Symmetric Cryptography], and [Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric
Cryptography].
With C2 established the adversary is free to complete the last two tactics,
exfiltration of data and impact. The C2 communication channel is crucial for the
adversary to continue forward and critical for the defender to detect and stop.
The tactic for data is competed with technique Exfiltration Over C2 Channel. This
is no need for additional software because Bazar executed [Command and
Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell] during the execution tactic. PowerShell
provides the adversary with secure copy (SCP) allowing the data to be exfiltrated
using the native built-in application. The last stage is the Impact tactic and like
with CKC, the adversary must be detected and stop as quickly as possible. The
complete up to date descriptions of the tactics and techniques can be referenced
at https://attack.mitre.org/techniques.
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Figure 8 ATT&CK With Bazar, Based on Duncan, 2021
Step 2. Align to Malware to Target
This Step is the exact same as described in the step two CKC analysis.
Please refer to that section for details on the Bazar malware to network
comparison. The figure shown here is from the CKC step analysis. During the
ATT&CK analysis, there is no change in how the Bazar malware moves through
the network during the ATT&CK analysis.
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Figure 9 Bazar Within Network, Based on Duncan,2021

Step 3. Combine ATT&CK Framework With Bazar Within the Target Network
Starting with step one of the analysis the level of detail that is produced by
MITRE ATT&CK framework is evident. In this part of the analysis the diagram
produced also displays a fair amount of detail. Like in the CKC analysis step
three of the CKC, the pre-attack steps will not be listed for being out of scope.
The first contact tactic is tactic three, Initial Access. Patterns begin to emerge as
the Bazar malware flows through the network. The patterns that emerge are the
factors that assist in malware analysis and defense.
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Figure 10 ATT&CK Applied to Malware Network

Observations
The two frameworks have been applied to the malware network. The two
frameworks provided a substantial amount of information. The CKC proved
informative with just 7 steps. The ATT&CK framework provided a great level of
detail about how the malware acted within the network. The benefit of the results
that each framework can provide to the small business may give the business
assistance in lowering the risk of compromise from malware/ransomware attack
and other threats that can be analyzed with these types of frameworks. While a
single product that covers many of the vectors observed might be outside of the
budget of some businesses, especially microbusinesses. The information
provided by a framework still has value.
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CKC Analysis Results
As part of the overall mission the primary object of the adversary is to
enter the network. Once inside the adversary can focus on whatever the final
goal of the mission may be. The observation is that steps three through five are
key for the adversary to enter the environment. Those steps are delivery,
exploitation, and installation. From the known behavior of the Bazar malware and
how it aligns with the seven steps of the CKC, a risk to the environment is
highlighted, see Figure 11.
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Figure 11 CKC Observed Steps 3-5

In the analysis the first point of contact is step three delivery. Each phase
has a recommended course of action. The actions are Detect, Deny, Disrupt,
Degrade, Deceive, and Destroy. The recommended actions for the delivery
phase from the CKC are listed on table two below. The Course of Action Matrix
provides four mitigating control recommendations. Two low-budget solutions and
two potentially costly solutions. The recommendations per phase are listed under
the action.
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Table 2. Course of Action Matrix for CKC (Hutchins E. et al, 2010)
Phase

Detect

Deny

Disrupt

Degrade

Delivery

Vigilant
user

Proxy
filter

In-line
AV

Queuing

Exploitation

HIDS

Patch

DEP

Installation

HIDS

Chroot
jail

AV

Deceive

Destroy

Reconnaissance
Weaponization

C2
Action on Objectives

Figure eleven has the user’s scope isolated within a shaded area. The
Bazar malware campaign exerted influenced over three items in the shaded
area. The first was that Bazar was able to arrive on the user’s PC via an email
that by-passed standard email filtration. Filtration services are offered to some
extent by all email service providers from Gmail to outlook365 often for free or as
part of the subscription service. Small businesses take advantage of the lower
cost and low maintenance requirements these services offer. Adversaries that
send out malicious emails are particularly good at creating email campaigns that
can often get passed filtering. For this reason, email filtering was not one of the
four recommendations.
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The four actions highlighted under delivery are Detect, Deny, Disrupt, and
Degrade. The recommended mitigations for Deny was Proxy filter and the
recommendation for Degrade was queuing. Both options for the small budget
small business are cost prohibited. These solutions incur some cost and require
some level of technical knowledge, often requiring the small businesses to hire
some type of professional services to deploy the solution and maintain it. The two
actions that are most favorable to the target small business are Detect and
Disrupt. The recommendation for detecting is vigilant user and for disrupting the
recommendation is inline antivirus (Hutchins E. et al, 2010).
The importance of the vigilant user to the defense of the network becomes
evident in figure eleven. The framework accurately shows how important the user
is in the Bazar campaign. The user has three opportunities to stop Bazar. The
value of understanding how to identify potentially malicious emails is visible. The
next two key items are first, the user needs to reach out to the call center and
second the user at the instruction of the call center, downloads a malicious file.
Users in this situation would benefit from knowing how to identify the email
senders. The CKC step four is exploitation and the mitigations for Detect, Deny,
and Disrupt are Host Intrusion Detection system (HIDS), Patch and Data
Execution Prevention (DEP) (Hutchins et al, 2010). At this phase for the small
business, only one recommendation has a cost and significant technical
requirement, and that action is HIDS. For a HIDS solution the business may also
need assistance deploying the solution and maintaining it. The other two are
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Patching and DEP. These are easily accessible mitigations. Microsoft provides
free security patches for their operating systems until they reach end of life.
Malicious code being executed via macros is such a big problem that
beginning April 2022 Microsoft will start blocking macros by default (Brown &
Eickmeyer, 2022). The last section of the CKC is step five installation and the
mitigations are Detect, Deny, and Disrupt are Host Intrusion Detection system
(HIDS), Chroot jail and Anti-Virus (AV) (Hutchins et al, 2010). Already discussed
are the problems with HIDS. The Deny action is Chroot jail, a feature not
available on the windows operating systems and the Disrupt option is AV that is
freely available with the windows operating system or available from third parties
for relatively low cost.
ATT&CK Analysis Results
The fourteen tactics of the ATT&CK matrix for enterprises are
Reconnaissance, Resource Development, Initial Access, Execution, Persistence,
Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion, Credential Access, Discovery, Lateral
Movement, Collection, Command and Control, Exfiltration, and Impact. It was
determined that only twelve of the 14 techniques apply to the simple small
business network. The techniques of the ATT&CK framework when applied to
the network produce a pattern near identical to the results of the CKC analysis.
The very robust ATT&CK framework is reduced to three of the twelve tactics in a
small simple network. This is because this environment is the basic minimum that
a small business would need to accomplish its business mission. The ATT&CK
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framework has proven itself to be a great tool for analysis of every detail of an
adversary’s attack methodology. The features that make the ATT&CK framework
great for larger enterprises, malware researchers, and security product
research/development are lost on small businesses. The three tactics that
emerge as having the greatest impact and that provide the potential for the best
and lowest cost mitigation are Initial Access, Execution, and Persistence, see
Figure 12.
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Figure 12 ATT&CK Observations Step 3-5
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There are more techniques within the three tactics of the ATT&CK
Framework than there were from the seven steps of the CKC. The ones specific
to the Bazar malware are listed in Table3. The MITRE ATT&CK framework
provides a series of recommended mitigations for each technique. The ATT&CK
framework also lists if there is no recommended mitigation or easily implemented
control.

Table 3. ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques Steps 3-5 (attack.mitre.org,
2022)
Tactic: Initial access

Tactic: Execution

Tactic:
Persistence

Phishing: Spear phishing
Link

Native API

BITS Jobs

Command and
Boot or Logon
Scripting Interpreter AutoStart
Execution:
Registry Run
Keys / Startup
Folder
Command and
Boot or Logon
Scripting
AutoStart
Interpreter:
Execution:
PowerShell
Winlogon
Helper DLL
User Execution:
Boot or Logon
Malicious Link
AutoStart
Execution:
Shortcut
Modification
Windows
Scheduled
Management
Task/Job
Instrumentation
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Scheduled
Task/Job

The mitigations for the techniques from steps three through five listed in
table three vary in ease and complexity. Referring to figure 12, the shaded area
highlights the user’s realm of influence over the environment. The first tactic is
Initial Access, and the technique is Phishing: Spear phishing Link. The ATT&CK
framework recommended mitigations for Bazar are Restrict Web-Based Content,
Software Configuration, and User Training restricting web-based content can be
challenging of a small business with limited technical resources to implement as
a technical solution. Often a small business would have to use an outsourced
resource for a technical solution. For all businesses big or small but especially
small ones with small budgets. The best option for a control would be an
acceptable use policy for the organization. There are freely available guides from
many sources, such as the document for NIST 800-53. NIST 800-53 section 3.1
Access controls provide much of the information needed for an organization to
create an acceptable use policy (NIST, 2020). The second mitigating control is
software configuration. It does require some technical knowledge for an
organization that self-host email but for those organization using a service like
Office 365 from Microsoft or Gsuite from google both vendors have guides
available to assist users (Davis et al., 2022). The third mitigation for Phishing:
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Spear phishing Link is User Training. The ATT&CK framework like the CKC has
identified the risk posed by the user.
Execution is the second tactic and the ATT&CK framework has assigned
six techniques to the Bazar malware. Some of the mitigations repeat within
techniques. These repeating controls would be good candidates to implement
because they cover more than one technique. Focusing on the overlapping
mitigations will reduce the amount of risk for several techniques while reducing
the amount of effort and time a risk mitigation project may take. The complete
graph of all grouped techniques to mitigations can be seen in APPENDIX C. The
graphed results of the techniques to mitigations exhibit how the ATT&CK matrix
mitigations can be used to find the ones that cover the most techniques. This is
extremely helpful to a budget conscience small business or organization.
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Figure 13 Overlapping Controls

To best mitigate against the Bazar malware based on the ATT&CK
Framework, the best mitigations to deploy would be execution prevention,
privilege account management, and user account management, see Figure 13.
The implementation of these three mitigations will also mitigate parts of the
following techniques: Native API, Command and Scripting Interpreter:
PowerShell, BITS Jobs, Windows Management Instrumentation, and Scheduled
Task/Job: Scheduled Task. The three mitigations from Figure 13 are user-related
and implementing them along with the user training mitigation mitigates both the
initial access and execution tactics. This will improve any organization’s security
posture.
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The MITRE ATT&CK Framework provides a significant amount of
information about this small network. The ATT&CK Framework was not limited by
the lack of data about the network but instead demonstrated that knowledge
about the behavior of the attack is enough to give a small network the information
needed to prepare a potential defense against an adversary. Like in the CKC, the
MITRE ATT&CK framework discovered mitigations that can be applied to any
network, especially small networks with limited resources.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Summary of Analysis
The analysis of Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain framework and the
ATT&CK Framework from MITRE produced similar results when applied to a
small simple network and a known malware. The network and malware were a
constant part of the analysis when each framework was applied. Each framework
had a different approach for the malware. The results were similar because of the
two constants. This allowed a back-to-back comparison that highlighted the
differences between the two. Similarities should be the focus of risk mitigation for
any budget conscience small business. The key similarity between the two
frameworks is the user. The user is known to be a major risk factor in the
prevention of any malware campaign the uses phishing techniques, malicious
files, malicious downloads, and malicious websites. Any of these malicious
techniques are a major threat to a business when put in front of an untrained
user. Both frameworks excelled at aligning with both the network and the
malware. The frameworks demonstrated that even small unsophisticated
networks benefit because both showed that the biggest risk to the network is the
user. The common mitigating controls to protect the network revolve around the
user since they assist in deploying the malware inside the network.
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Which Components are Relevant to Small Office Networks?
The best components from both frameworks that are most relevant to the
small business network from the analysis are steps three, four and five. These
three steps provide the most impact on any organization. The three steps from
the CKC are Delivery, Exploitation, and Installation. The mitigations from the
steps are Vigilant user, Proxy filter, In-line AV, HIDS, Patch, and DEP. Steps
three, four and five of the ATT&CK framework are Initial Access, Execution, and
Persistence for the associated mitigations refer to APPENDIX A.
Can These Components be Applied to Small Office Networks?
The analysis demonstrated that in the three elements that both
frameworks have in common, it is training users to be more vigilant and aware of
potentially malicious email, files and website has a major impact on prevention.
The user training will benefit all organizations but in small and micro businesses
that do not have large budgets for sophisticated hardware and software or for
dedicated technical staff, user training offers the greatest benefit. The second
control from the three components that benefit the organization and is also
associated with user behavior is the hardening of users' devices. The ATT&CK
framework points this out because of the level detail it produces for steps three
through five.
Conclusion
This project setup an analysis of two kill chain frameworks and reviewed
how they applied to a known malware and applied that information to a simple
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small network. Then looked at what the information gathered could be applied
lied to a business that has a small size and budget. While no recommendation is
a guarantee of attack prevention. What was learned is that some mitigations can
improve an organization's security posture while not requiring complicated
technical solutions or incurring large financial costs. In conclusion, a wellinformed user has proven to be a particularly good defense.
Future Work
The aspect of cyber defense with methods that are affordable and
available to small businesses, microbusinesses and the small office home office
is a subject that has been neglected. This opens the landscape for future work to
look at more variables and solutions to the problem that malware and
ransomware pose to these small budget entities. There is much more work to
assist these entities in improving their cyber defense postures.
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APPENDIX A:
ATT&CK FRAMEWORK BAZAR STEPS 3-5 MITIGATION MATRIX
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Technique
Phishing:
Spearphis
hing Link

Tactic
Initial
access

Mitigation
Restrict Web-Based
Content

Software
Configuration

User Training
Native
API

Executi
on

Antivirus/Antimalw
are
Behavior Prevention
on Endpoint

Disable or Remove
Feature or Program

Description
Determine if certain websites that can be used
for spear phishing are necessary for business
operations and consider blocking access if
activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a
significant risk.
Use anti-spoofing and email authentication
mechanisms to filter messages based on validity
checks of the sender domain
Users can be trained to identify social
engineering techniques and spear phishing
emails with malicious links.
Anti-virus can be used to automatically
quarantine suspicious files.
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface
Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent Visual Basic
and JavaScript scripts from executing potentially
malicious downloaded content
Disable or remove any unnecessary or unused
shells or interpreters.
Use application control where appropriate.

Reference
https://attack.
mitre.org/tech
niques/T1566
/002/

https://attack.
mitre.org/tech
niques/T1059
/

Execution
Prevention
Privileged Account
Management

Command
and
Scripting
Interpreter
:
Windows
Command
Shell
Command
and
Scripting
Interpreter
:
PowerShe
ll

Executi
on

Execution
Prevention

Executi
on

Antivirus/Antimalw
are
Disable or Remove
Feature or Program

Execution
Prevention
Privileged Account
Management

When PowerShell is necessary, restrict
PowerShell execution policy to administrators.
Be aware that there are methods of bypassing
the PowerShell execution policy, depending on
environment configuration.
Use application control where appropriate.

Anti-virus can be used to automatically
quarantine suspicious files.
It may be possible to remove PowerShell from
systems when not needed, but a review should
be performed to assess the impact to an
environment, since it could be in use for many
legitimate purposes and administrative
functions.
Use application control where appropriate.
When PowerShell is necessary, restrict
PowerShell execution policy to administrators.
Be aware that there are methods of bypassing
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https://attack.
mitre.org/tech
niques/T1059
/003/

https://attack.
mitre.org/tech
niques/T1059
/001/

User
Execution
:
Malicious
Link

Executi
on

Network Intrusion
Prevention

Restrict Web-Based
Content

User Training

Windows
Managem
ent
Instrumen
tation

Executi
on

Behavior Prevention
on Endpoint

Execution
Prevention

Scheduled
Task/Job:
Scheduled
Task

Executi
on

the PowerShell execution policy, depending on
environment configuration.
If a link is being visited by a user, network
intrusion prevention systems and systems
designed to scan and remove malicious
downloads can be used to block activity.
if a link is being visited by a user, block
unknown or unused files in transit by default
that should not be downloaded or by policy from
suspicious sites as a best practice to prevent
some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc.
Some download scanning devices can open and
analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such
as zip and rar that may be used to conceal
malicious files.
Use user training as a way to bring awareness to
common phishing and spear phishing techniques
and how to raise suspicion for potentially
malicious events
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface
Reduction (ASR) rules to block processes
created by WMI commands from running. Note:
many legitimate tools and applications utilize
WMI for command execution.
Use application control configured to block
execution of wmic.exe if it is not required for a
given system or network to prevent potential
misuse by adversaries. For example, in
Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016 and
above, Windows Defender Application Control
(WDAC) policy rules may be applied to block
the wmic.exe application and to prevent abuse.

Privileged Account
Management

Prevent credential overlap across systems of
administrator and privileged accounts.

User Account
Management

By default, only administrators are allowed to
connect remotely using WMI. Restrict other
users who are allowed to connect or disallow all
users to connect remotely to WMI.

Audit

Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain
PowerUp modules that can be used to explore
systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled
tasks that could be used to escalate privileges.
Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force
tasks to run under the context of the
authenticated account instead of allowing them
to run as SYSTEM.
Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority
option to only allow the Administrators group
the rights to schedule a priority process.

Operating System
Configuration

Privileged Account
Management
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https://attack.
mitre.org/tech
niques/T1204
/001/

https://attack.
mitre.org/tech
niques/T1047
/

https://attack.
mitre.org/tech
niques/T1053
/005/

User Account
Management

BITS Jobs

Persiste
nce

Filter Network
Traffic
Operating System
Configuration

Boot or
Logon
AutoStart
Execution
: Registry
Run Keys
/ Startup
Folder
Boot or
Logon
AutoStart
Execution
:
Winlogon
Helper
DLL

Persiste
nce

Boot or
Logon
AutoStart
Execution
: Shortcut
Modificati
on
Scheduled
Task/Job

Persiste
nce

Persiste
nce

Persiste
nce

User Account
Management
none

Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate
Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized
administrators can create scheduled tasks on
remote system
Modify network and/or host firewall rules, as
well as other network controls, to only allow
legitimate BITS traffic.
Consider reducing the default BITS job lifetime
in Group Policy or Registry
Consider limiting access to the BITS interface to
specific users or groups.

https://attack.
mitre.org/tech
niques/T1197
/

This type of attack technique cannot be easily
mitigated with preventive controls since it is
based on the abuse of system features.

https://attack.
mitre.org/tech
niques/T1547
/001/

Identify and block potentially malicious
software that may be executed through the
Winlogon helper process by using application
control tools like App Locker that are capable of
auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.
Limit the privileges of user accounts so that only
authorized administrators can perform Winlogon
helper changes.

https://attack.
mitre.org/tech
niques/T1547
/004/

User Account
Management

Limit permissions for who can create symbolic
links in Windows to appropriate groups such as
Administrators

https://attack.
mitre.org/tech
niques/T1547
/009/

Audit

Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain
PowerUp modules that can be used to explore
systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled
tasks that could be used to escalate privileges.
Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force
tasks to run under the context of the
authenticated account instead of allowing them
to run as SYSTEM.
Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority
option to only allow the Administrators group
the rights to schedule a priority process.
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate
Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized
administrators can create scheduled tasks on
remote systems.

https://attack.
mitre.org/tech
niques/T1053
/005/

Execution
Prevention

User Account
Management

Operating System
Configuration

Privileged Account
Management
User Account
Management
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APPENDIX B:
ATT&CK TECHNIQUES WITH MITIGATION IN COMMON
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